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We present a proof of principle demonstration of a quantum key distribution scheme in higher-
order d-dimensional alphabets using spatial degrees of freedom of photons. Our implementation
allows for the transmission of 4.56 bits per sifted photon, while providing improved security: an
intercept-resend attack on all photons would induce an average error rate of 0.47. Using our system,
it should be possible to send more than a byte of information per sifted photon.
Though quantum key distribution (QKD) has become
a commercial reality [1], there is still much interest in fun-
damental research. One topic of fundamental importance
is the design of protocols and implementations which in-
crease the bit transmission rate and/or the security of
the QKD scheme. It has been pointed out recently that
one can achieve both of these objectives by increasing the
dimensionality of the system, that is, encoding a random
key string in d-dimensional qudits instead of the usual
binary qubits [2, 3].
It is straightforward to generalize the well-known BB84
protocol [5] to qudits [2, 3, 4], for which it is possible
to send on average log2 d bits per sifted qudit. Higher-
dimensional qudits are advantageous not only for an in-
creased bit transmission rate, but also increased security.
An eavesdropper employing an intercept-resend strategy
would induce a qudit error rate of Ed =
1
2
d−1
d
, since
half the time she measures in the wrong basis, and con-
sequently sends the wrong state with a probability of
(d− 1)/d [2, 3].
Experimentally, there are several methods of encoding
d-dimensional qudits in photons, including time-bin [2],
orbital angular momentum [6], the polarization state of
more than one photon [7], and more recently position and
linear momentum of entangled photons [8, 9].
Here we provide an experimental demonstration
of quantum key distribution using higher-order d-
dimensional alphabets encoded in the transverse spatial
profile of single photons. Our scheme is based on the
standard BB84 protocol [5], in which Alice chooses which
state to send based on the value of a random bit a1, while
her choice of basis is selected using random bit a2. A two-
basis BB84 protocol using qudits works the same way
[2, 3], however, Alice sends states according to the value
of a random d-level “dit”. A simple illustration of our
scheme is shown in FIG. 1. Let us first discuss the choice
of basis. In our scheme, Alice (A) and Bob (B) encode
(Alice) and decode (Bob) information in the transverse
profile of single photons by choosing randomly between
optical imaging systems and optical Fourier transform
systems. In order to avoid the quadratic phase factors
that generally appear in an imaging system [10], it is
necessary to use a telescopic lens system, consisting of
two confocal lenses. This is equivalent to applying the
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FIG. 1: Illustration of QKD using imaging (I) and Fourier
(F ) optical systems.
Fourier transform operation twice, so that, as part of the
protocol, Alice and Bob will each choose randomly be-
tween a single or double Fourier transform lens system.
For simplicity, let us assume that Alice and Bob use iden-
tical imaging systems, consisting of two lenses with focal
length f , as well as identical Fourier systems consisting of
a single lens with focal length 2f . The “quantum chan-
nel” consists of a telescopic lens system consisting of two
lenses with focal length fc which transmits Alice’s output
to Bob’s input.
In the following we will assume that the input field is a
single photon state, which in the paraxial approximation
can be described by
|ψ〉 =
∫
v(q) |q〉 dq, (1)
where v(q) is the angular spectrum defined by
v(q) =
∫
W(ρ, 0)e−iq·ρdρ, (2)
and W(ρ, 0) is the input field at z = 0 (plane PAin).
Here q is the transverse component of the wave vector
and ρ is the transverse position coordinate. The de-
tection probability in plane PB for a given combination
of lens configurations is given by Pαβ(ρ) = |Aαβ(ρ)|
2,
where A(ρ) = 〈vac|E+αβ(ρ) |ψ〉 is the detection ampli-
tude, E+αβ(ρ) is the field operator for the entire lens sys-
tem [11, 12], and α, β = I, F denotes either imaging or
Fourier configurations. For a series of n confocal lenses,
2E
+
αβ(ρ) simplifies to
E
+
αβ(ρ) =E
∫
dq
∫
dq1 · · ·
∫
dqna(qn)e
iq·ρ×
e−i
f1
k
q1·q · · · e−i
fn
k
qn·qn−1 , (3)
where E is a constant, k is the magnitude of the wavevec-
tor, fj is the focal length of the j
th lens and a(q) is the
usual destruction operator. For the four possible lens
systems illustrated in FIG. 1, the detection amplitudes
are
AFF (ρ) =
Ek2
2fcf
W(ρ, 0), (4)
AII(ρ) =
Ek3
fcf2
W(−ρ, 0), (5)
AIF (ρ) =
Ek3
2fcf2
v
(
k
2f
ρ
)
, (6)
and
AFI(ρ) =
Ek3
2fcf2
v
(
k
2f
ρ
)
. (7)
In our scheme, Alice encodes information into the in-
put field by positioning an aperture A(ρ − ρd) in plane
PAin, such that each aperture position ρd corresponds
to a character in the d-dimensional alphabet. Assuming
that the incident field is a plane wave, the input field is
equivalent to the aperture function: W(ρ, 0) = A(ρ−ρd).
Eqs. (4) and (5) show that when Alice and Bob choose
the same lens configuration, Bob’s detection amplitudes
will reproduce the aperture function, and Bob should de-
code the correct character. For complementary lens con-
figurations the detection amplitudes are given by Eqs.
(6) and (7), and are proportional to the Fourier trans-
form of the aperture. A well known property of the
Fourier transform is that a shift in position space man-
ifests as a phase in the Fourier transform (F) space:
F [A(ρ − ρd)] = exp(ikρρd/2f) × F [A(ρ)]. Thus the
detection probabilities PIF and PFI contain no informa-
tion concerning the aperture position ρd. Even though
Alice and Bob discard these results as part of the BB84
protocol, it is important that no information is available,
as this guarantees that an eavesdropper cannot obtain in-
formation without causing an increase in the error rate.
FIG. 2 shows the setup for an experimental demon-
stration of QKD using spatially encoded qudits. As is
common in most QKD implementations, our experiment
was performed with an attenuated laser beam, which,
though there are zero- and multi-photon terms present,
can be used to approximate a single photon state [13].
The attenuated beam from a Coherent Verdi V5 laser
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FIG. 2: Experimental setup.
(514 nm) was expanded by a factor of 4 using a beam
expander consisting of 25mm and 100mm focal length
lenses. Information was encoded into the spatial pro-
file by positioning a 200µm pinhole in Alice’s transverse
plane PAin. The pinhole was mounted on a manual x− y
translation stage, though in principle a randomly-driven
mechanical device could be used. In order to implement
both imaging and Fourier configurations, we constructed
a Mach-Zehnder interferometer using 50-50 beam split-
ters (BS), in which one arm contained a telescopic imag-
ing system (f = 100mm), while the other contained a
200mm focal length lens in a Fourier configuration. To
switch between imaging and Fourier configurations, we
toggled manually between the two arms of the interfer-
ometer. As interference is not actually used in the QKD
scheme, the interferometer functions merely as a router.
However, the interference is useful for initial alignment.
Pinholes were placed in the focal planes of the imaging
and Fourier lenses in order to filter higher spatial fre-
quencies. As a result, the aperture function A(ρ − ρd)
can be approximated by a Gaussian. The quantum chan-
nel consisted of a telescopic lens system (fc = 150mm).
Using a BS, Bob chose randomly between imaging
and Fourier systems. His optical systems were identical
to Alice’s. One single photon detector (equipped with
200µm diameter circular detection aperture and ∼ 250
nm bandwidth filter) was scanned throughout the Fourier
detection plane, and one throughout the image detec-
tion plane. Ideally, the detection system would consist
of either two-dimensional multi-detector arrays, or CCD
cameras with single-photon sensitivity [14].
The dimension d of Alice and Bob’ s alphabet is deter-
mined by the size of the aperture A(ρ) and its Fourier
transform. Alice and Bob must decide on the best way to
define positions in transverse planes PAin (Alice’s aper-
ture) and PB (Bob’s detector) that will correspond to
the characters in their alphabet. To use the area avail-
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FIG. 3: Intensity distributions at Bob’s detection plane for
the four lens configurations II , IF , FI and FF for the case
when Alice sends the character “7”. Here lighter squares cor-
respond to a larger number of photo-counts.
able in the most efficient manner, we chose to approxi-
mate Alice’s circular aperture and Bob’s circular detec-
tion aperture with a hexagon (center to vertex distance
200µm). Using this method, we were able to work with
a 37-dimensional (“septrigesimal”) alphabet. Alice and
Bob’s encoding/decoding scheme is shown at the bottom
of FIG. 2. The circle corresponds to the area containing
99% of the large Gaussian profile obtained using comple-
mentary IF or FI configurations.
FIG. 3 shows the intensity pattern at Bob’s detection
plane for the four possible lens configurations when Alice
sends the character “7”. The distributions were obtained
by placing the detector at each of the pre-defined detec-
tion positions, so that each of the 37 squares in the figures
correspond to a character in the alphabet. For II and
FF configurations, Bob detects the character “7” with
high probability, while for IF and FI configurations, he
obtains a widened (Gaussian) distribution, which pro-
vides little information about the character Alice sent.
As a better visualization of our results, FIG.’s 4 and 5
show probability distributions as a function of each char-
acter for Bob’s Fourier and image detection systems, re-
spectively. In both FIG.’s, Alice has sent the characters
“4”, “7”, “G”, “H”, “P” and “Z”. When Bob uses the
same lens configuration as Alice (left side in both figures),
he detects the correct character with a high probability.
We obtained error rates DFFk ∼ 0.06 − 0.11 for the FF
configuration and DII ∼ 0.10 − 0.19 for II configura-
tion. Roughly 25% of the error was due to photo-counts
caused by unwanted ambient light and dark counts (∼
200 counts/sec), while the rest is due to misalignment
and erroneous counts due to the hexagon pattern. Using
narrow band interference filters and detectors with a re-
duced dark count rate (∼ 25-50 counts/sec), we estimate
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FIG. 4: Normalized counts for Bob’s Fourier (F ) detection
system when Alice uses Fourier (left) and Image (right) en-
coding.
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FIG. 5: Normalized counts for Bob’s Image (I) detection
system when Alice uses Image (left) and Fourier (right) en-
coding.
that the error rates could easily be reduced to about 5
- 15%. Further methods to reduce the II and FF error
rate involve “decoy” alphabet states and will be discussed
elsewhere [12].
FIG.’s 4 and 5 also show the results when Alice and
Bob use conjugate IF or FI configurations, from which
it can be seen that the detection probabilities PIF and
PFI are the approximately the same for all character’s
sent by Alice. We note that Bob’s detection positions
4were defined according to the two-dimensional detection
scheme shown in FIG. 2, so the several peaks shown in
the IF and FI patterns are actually slices of a 3D Gaus-
sian distribution. There is a difference between our QKD
implementation and others: the detection probabilities
for complementary measurements are not constant for
all states: PIF = PFI 6= 1/d and thus the sifted key is
not completely random. However, after sifting, Alice and
Bob can discard some of their results in order to obtain
a completely random key string.
In order to minimize Eve’s information, Alice should
choose characters based on the distributions PIF and
PFI . Suppose that Alice sends each character k with
probability Pk, obtained by averaging the IF and FI
detection results. The amount of information that can
be sent from Alice to Bob is given by the Shannon infor-
mation [3, 13], which in our case is
IAB =IA +
d−1∑
k=0
Pk(1− Ek) log2(1− Ek)
+
d−1∑
k=0
d−1∑
j=0,j 6=k
PkEkPj
1− Pk
log2
EkPj
1− Pk
, (8)
where Ek is the error probability and I
A =
−
∑d−1
k=0 Pk log2 Pk = 4.56 bits/photon is the information
transmission in the absence of errors. Our experimen-
tal error rates DII and DFF varied between 0.06 and
0.19, giving 3.00 ≤ IAB ≤ 3.96 bits/photon. For an
intercept-resend attack on a fraction η of the photons,
the error rate is Ek =
η
2
(1 − Pk), which varies between
0.450η and 0.499η. In this case, Eve’s information is
given by IE = − η
2
∑d−1
k=0 Pk log2 Pk = 2.28η bits/photon.
In order to employ classical error correction and pri-
vacy amplification, it is necessary that IAB > IE [13].
IAB = IE = 1.858 bits/photon occurs when the average
error rate E =
∑
k PkEk is about 0.38, much larger than
our values of 0.06−0.19. We note that the allowable error
rate for cloning-based individual attacks on a two-basis
d = 37 protocol is 0.42[4] [15].
Let us briefly discuss an important security issue par-
ticular to this implementation. A more detailed security
analysis will be provided elsewhere [12]. In order for the
transmission to be secure, an eavesdropper Eve should
not be able to determine when Alice is using the imaging
or Fourier system to encode information. If there ex-
ist detection positions at which Eve can detect photons
that probably correspond to an I-F or F -I (Alice-Eve)
configuration, then she can deduce that she measured in
the wrong basis, and choose not to resend the photon.
Eve’s presence would then be marked only as the loss of
a photon, and not a registered error. In order to avoid
this situation, Alice and Bob must define their alphabet
so that every detection position with a nonzero IF or
FI detection probability also has a nonzero II or FF
detection probability. In this fashion, Eve cannot deduce
whether she is measuring in the same basis as Alice or
not. On the other hand, if Eve can deduce that she prob-
ably measured in the correct basis, she gains nothing by
not sending the photon. Of course she has gained infor-
mation and left no disturbance, but Alice and Bob can
minimize these cases by removing these characters from
the final sifted key string, at the cost of a reduction in
the size d of the alphabet.
We have presented a proof of principle demonstration
of QKD using spatially encoded qudits. Generalization
of our scheme to even larger dimensions is straightfor-
ward. Using an even smaller aperture, it should be pos-
sible to encode an extremely large amount of information,
increasing both the transmission rate as well as the se-
curity of the QKD protocol. For example, using a 60µm
pinhole, should give an alphabet of roughly 400 charac-
ters in each photon, resulting in a transmission capacity
of more than 1 byte per sifted photon. In terms of a real-
world application, QKD based on spatial qudits seems
best suited for free-space transmission as opposed to op-
tical fibers. In a free-space setup, disturbances in the
wavefront due to propagation through the atmosphere
might be monitored using a reference beam, and then
corrected.
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